Abstract-Modular design is a common approach for dealing with complex tasks in modern cryptology. The critical of this approach is to design a secure hybrid protocol. In this paper, we study password-based key exchange in the three-party setting within the UC framework and design a hybrid protocol that UC-securely realizes such task. Next we partition the task into two sub-tasks, three-party key distribution and passwordbased two-party key exchange, and propose relevant two ideal functionalities, F3pKD, FpwKE. Finally, we present a (F3pKD, FpwKE) -hybrid protocol for password-based three-party key exchange that is proved to be UC-secure with respect to nonadaptive party corruption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Protocols for password-based two-party key exchange allow two parties to use their shared password in order to exchange a common session key. They are designed to be secure even when the shared secret key between two parties is a human-memorable password. Passwords are mostly used because they are easier to remember by humans. However, when a party wants to communicate with many other parties, the number of password that a party needs to remember may be linear in the number of possible partners. In order to limit the number of passwords that each party needs to remember, password-based key exchange in the three-party setting, where each party only shares a password with a trusted server, have been received much attention in recent years. The main advantage of this solution is that it provides each party with the capability of communicating securely with other parties in the system while only requiring it to remember a single password. Its main drawback is that the server is needed during the establishment of all communication as in the Needham and Schroeder protocol [1] .
Password-based three-party key exchange has been extensively studied in the last few years. The first work in this area was the protocol of Needham and Schroeder. Later, Bellare and Rogaway introduced a formal security model in this scenario along with a construction of the first provably-secure symmetric key-based key distribution scheme [2] . After then, a special but important case in which the secret keys are drawn from a small set of values was considered by Michel Abdalla etc in [3] . In addition, they proposed a first provable-secure protocol in the threeparty setting.
A general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security is proposed by R.Canetti [4, 5] . The definitions of security, which is called UC security, in the UC framework, follow an approach which is referred to as "security by emulation of an ideal process". Informally speaking, this approach proceeds as follows: firstly defining an ideal functionality which captures the basic security requirement for a task and a protocol is said to UC securely realize this task if it "emulates" the ideal protocol for this ideal functionality. In contrast, the definition of some conventional security follows a different definitional approach which is called "security by indistinguishability", such as the definitions of AKE security and CCA security. Researches on the relationship between the indistinguishability-based definition of security and the emulation-based definition of security have become one of the significant topics in cryptography [6] . It's seen that the emulation-based definition of security is more convenient in the design of hybrid protocol. Any protocol that is proven to be UC secure is guaranteed by UC composition theorem to remain secure when run concurrently with arbitrary other protocols. The UC composition theorem is a powerful tool for modular design and analysis of complex protocol.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Participant and initialization
For simplicity, we model the distributed system as a fixed polynomial-size set of m client parties = {P 1 ,…,P m }. In addition, there is a trusted server P T which is not a member of . Each party P i has a long-term password sk i , while P T holds a vector sk T = (sk i ) for all . Any two parties of together with P {1, , } m i T are allowed to run the three-party key distribution protocol at any time in order to obtain a session key. We denote instance s of client party P i as s i P , and denote instance t of trusted server P T as .
t T P B. Key privacy with respect to sever
Key privacy with respect to sever (KP) was first proposed by Abdalla etc [3] . From this security requirement, even though the server's help is required to establish a session key between two clients in the distributed system, the value of session key should be only known by two clients, so other participants adversary and even sever should not be able to gain any useful information about session key. Then the server is regarded as "honest but curious". The KP security notion is the main different between three-party key distribution task and three-party key exchange task.
C. Some notions for ideal functionality
Delayed output. We often want to capture the fact that outputs generated by interactive protocol may be delayed due to delays in message delivery. We say that an ideal functionality F sends a delayed output v to some party P if it engages in the following interaction: Instead of simply outputting v to P, F first sends to the adversary a note that it is ready to generate an output to P. If the output is public, then the value v is included in the note to the adversary. If the output is private, then v is not mentioned in this note. Furthermore, the note contains a unique identifier that distinguishes it from all other messages sent by F to the Party corruptions. Adaptive party corruptions, namely corruptions that occur as the comput adversary in this execution. When the adversary replies to the note, F outputs the value v to P. ation proceeds, based on the UC framework. In addition to co IDEAL FUNCTIONALITY Give sk of assword-based three-party key exchange is to allow two un :
1)
unicate with other client.
2) eanwhile
3)
chieved by corrupting one W The nstance of F 3 ince the information gathered by the adversary so far. Nonetheless, it is sometimes useful to consider also a weaker threat model, where the identities of the adversarially controlled parties are fixed before the computation starts; this is the case of non-adaptive party corruption.
Hybrid protocol. Hybrid protocol is a special type of protocol in mmunicating via the adversary in the usual way, the parties also make calls to the instances of ideal functionalities.
III. DEFINITION OF n a domain G of key space, the basic ta p corrupted clients to exchange the same session key that is chosen randomly from the domain G by the help of a trusted server, as long as the shared password between each client and server is identical.
Some assumption of the behaviors of the realistic adversary are given as follows Upon guessing one password correctly, adversary can imitate one client to comm The imitation of adversary can be "honestly" or "dishonestly". Since "dishonestly" adversary is more dangerous than "honestly" adversary, we assume that adversary's imitation is "dishonestly". Then, It means that two clients can't establish session key because the session key is exchanged successfully only under the "honestly" executing of three participants. It's unnecessary for adversary to guess password if any one of three participants is corrupted, m assume that adversary doesn't corrupt parties no more after guessing passwords. Note that the goal of the adversary is to obtain session key, and this goal can be a client. Therefore, assume that the adversary corrupts one client at most. Then, the adversary can totally control the output of the corrupted client. But, the adversary can't decide the value of session key as it wishes, because the value of session key can't be chosen by one client in the key exchange. e now briefly explain our ideal functionality F 3pwKE . full description is given in Figure 1 . An i pwKE deals with the generation of a single session key. The generation of multi-session key is obtained by using 3 pwKE F , the multiple session extension of F 3pwKE .
In the definition of F 3pwKE , the password is chosen by the enviro t who then sends it to the parties as input. S nmen we me assword guess, but the ad om the domain G. Finally, this session key is de ain G of key space, F proceeds as follows, party P , record (Trustedser ,P ,pw ,role) from any party P (P quantify over all environments, this implies that security is preserved for all efficient password distributions.
As expected, F 3pwKE begins with a trusted server phrase. When F 3pwKE is notified who is a trusted server, it sends this ssage to all the parties as well as the adversary. Next, F 3pwKE waits Newsession message that would be sent by two client parties and a trusted server. We remark that the "role" variable in the Newsession message, such as (NewSession,sid,pid,P i , pw i ,role), is included in order to let a party know its role initiator, responder or server in the execution. This has no effect on the security, but is needed for correct executions. Once F 3pwKE receives notifications from the three parties with identical values of sid and pid, it enters a "ready" state and sends ready message (Session, sid, pid, ready) to the adversary.
In the F 3pwKE , a session is marked as compromised if the adversary makes a successful p versary can't get any useful information of session key with the security requirement of KP. If the adversary makes an incorrect password guess in a given session, then the session is marked as interrupted and F 3pwKE will send error message to all the uncorrupted parties in the Keydelivery phase. Note that in the real world, making a password guess means that adversary modifies the transferred message. Therefore, incorrect password guess can be easily detected by parties and causes error in the execution of the protocol.
Then, F 3pwKE chooses a session key N uniformly at random fr livered to the two client parties after bein requested by the adversary. Note that for each client party, the adversary may send two types of Keydelivery query. One type is a key message (Keydeliver,sid,pid,P
N ), the other is an error message (Key,sid,pid,P i ,error).
Given a security parameter k and a dom 3pwKE
Trustedserver: Upon receiving a query (Trustedserver,sid,P T ) from any T ver,sid,P T ) and send this record to all the parties and adversary S.
Initialization: Upon receiving a query (NewSession,sid,pid i i
for P T and some party P j , then record (sid,pid,P i ,pw i ) and send (sid,pid,P i ,role) to S receiving a query (NewSession,sid,pid, P T , 
2) Else, send a public delayed output (Key,sid, pid,P ,error) P .
i to i Upo receiving a query (Key,sid,pid,P 2. n i ,error) from the S ny key has been before a already sent to P i , then send (Key,sid,pid,P i ,error) to P i . The following c rst is that ch ases should be emphasized. The fi if the session is marked compromised, F 3pwKE will oose a new random session key for each client and send a private delay output to the client. The second, if the shared key between any client party and trusted server is not identical, F 3pwKE will send error message to all uncorrupted parties. The third is that F 3pwKE will send (Key,sid,pid,P i ,error) to P i whenever it receives (Key, sid,pid,P i ,error) from the adversary.
IV. BUILDING BLOCK
A. Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption: DDH
Assume G is a cycle group with prime p order and g is a generator. Roughly, the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) states that the distributions (g u ,g v ,g uv ) and (g u ,g v ,g w ) are computationally indistinguishable when u,v,w are drawn at random between 1 and the order of G.
B. Message Authentication Code (MAC)
A message authentication code MAC = (Tag,VF) is defined by the following two algorithms: (1) A generation algorithm Tag, possibly probabilistic, which given a message m and a secret key sk, produces a tag ȝ; and (2) A verification algorithm VF, which given a tag ȝ, a message m, and a secret key sk, outputs 1 if ȝ is a valid tag for m under sk and 0, otherwise. The security notion that we need for the MAC scheme is strong existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (EU-CMA), which is based on existential unforgeability notion in [7] .
C. Password-based key exchange (pwKE)
A (two-party) password-based key exchange is a protocol where two parties use their shared password in order to exchange a common session key. An ideal functionality, F pwKE , for two-party password-based key exchange and a real-life protocol that UC-securely realize F pwKE is proposed by R.Canetti in [8] .
D. Three-party key distribution (KD)
The main idea of three-party key distribution is to allow two client parties to obtain the same session key from trusted server, as long as the shared private key between each client party and trusted server is identical. We propose an appropriate ideal functionality, F 3pKD , for three-party key distribution and a UC-secure real-life protocol for F 3pKD in [9] .
V. UC-SECURE PASSWORD-BASED THREE-PARTY KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
We present our generic construction of the protocol. This generic construction can be seen as a form of complier, which transfers any UC-secure password-based two-party exchange protocol into UC-secure password-based threeparty key exchange protocol. Assume DDH assumption is hold in group G and g is a generator, the generic construction of our protocol is described in Figure 2 .
The full description of our proposed protocol is given in Fig 3. Except for the main flow as described in Fig 2, the full description contains initialization phrase and keyoutput phrase. The inputs of P i , P j, , P T is given by the "high level " calling protocol. Note that the SID in the NewSession input has the form of (sid,ssid 1 ,ssid 2 ). Because there are two surbouting calling for F 3pwKE in the execution of protocol S , so ssid 1 , ssid 2 are the SID identifier of the two sub-session.
Assume DDH assumption is hold in group G and g is a generator, S proceeds as follows,
1) Upon party P T is activated with a input
(Trustedserver,sid,P T ), P T send (Trustedserver,sid,P T ) to all the parties and F 3pKD . Upon P T receiving a input (NewSession,sid,ssid 1 ,ssid 2 ,pw i ,pw j ,role), if role= server and pid=(P i ,P j ,P T ), P T send (NewSession,sid, ssid 1 ,pid 1 ,P T ,pw i ,role) with pid 1 =(P i ,P T ) and (NewSession,sid,ssid 2 ,pid 2 ,P T ,pw ji ,role) with pid 2 = (P j ,P T ) to ˆp wKE F .
2)
Upon party P i is activated with a query (NewSession,sid,ssid 1 ,pid,pw i ,initiator), with pid= (P i ,P j ,P T ), P i send (NewSession,sid,ssid 1 ,pid 1 ,pw i , role) to ˆp wKE F . Upon party P j is activated with a query (NewSession,sid,ssid 2 ,pid,pw j ,responder) with pid= (P i ,P j ,P T ), P j send (NewSession,sid,ssid 2 ,pid 2 ,pw j ,role) with pid 2 = (P j ,P T ) toˆp wKE F .
3) Upon parties P i and P T both receiving (sid,ssid 1 ,pid 1 ,sk i ) from ˆp wKE F and parties P j , P T also both receiving (sid,ssid 2 ,pid 2 ,sk j ) fromˆp wKE F , then do: P i send (NewSession,sid,pid,P i ,sk i ,role), P j send (NewSession,sid,pid,P j ,sk j ,role) and P T send (NewSession,sid,pid,P T ,sk i ,sk j ,role) to F 3pKD . In addition, P T sends (Sessionkey,sid,pid) to F 3pKD . 4) If P i (P j ) receives error message from F 3pKD , it outputs error message to all other parties and terminates. In this case, P j also outputs error message and terminates. 
Theorem 1
Assume that DDH assumption is hold in the group G and (MAC,VF) is an EU-CMA secure message authentication code, then password-based three-party key exchange protocol S UC-securely realizes F 3pwKE with respect to non-adaptive party corruption. . Proof In order to prove this theorem, we need to show that for any PPT real-world adversary A, there is an idealprocess adversary S, such that no poly-time environment Z can distinguish with non-negligible probability whether it interacts with A and parties running S in the real world, or with S and parties communicating with ideal functionality in the ideal process. The description of simulator S is as follows:
S will invoke an instance of adversary A and simulates the execution of protocol S for A. Thereafter, S makes use of the information that is sent in the simulating protocol to achieve the goal that Z can't distinguish ideal process Suppose that no client is corrupted. Then, if A guesses password successfully or corrupts the server, P i and P j will output two different session key both randomly chosen from key space either in the real world or in the ideal process. If A guess passwords wrongly, P i and P j will both output error message either in the ideal process or in the real world. If there is no password guessing query, we argue that in the real world, Z will get no useful information of session key from party P i or P j and the key output by P i or P j is identical. Furthermore, P i will output error message in the real world iff P i will output error message in the ideal world, while P i will output g xy in the real world iff P i will output in the ideal process. Since both g N xy and are chosen at random from group G, so suffice the indistinguishability.
N
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study and formulate an appropriate ideal functionality, which captures the basic idea and security requirements of password-based three-party key exchange. Next, we partition the task for three-party key exchange into two sub-tasks. One is password-based twoparty key exchange; the other is three-party key distribution. Finally, we propose a hybrid protocol that UC securely realizes such ideal functionality with respect to nonadaptive party corruption.
